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State Dept. review completed

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
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NGA Review Complete

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# Weekly Summary

STATE DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMPLETED

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August 13, 1976

NGA review(s) completed.

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August 13, 1976

The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.

### 1 Europe

Greece-Turkey; Italy;  
Portugal; USSR; USSR-Australia;  
Germany; USSR-Somalia

### 4 Middle East - Africa

Rhodesia; South Africa;  
Lebanon; Syria-USSR;  
Kenya-Uganda; Kuwait

### 7 East Asia Pacific

China; Thailand-Vietnam;  
Japan; North Korea


### 10 South Africa: *The June Rioting*

### 12 Tan-Zam Railroad Completed

### 14 Sudan: *Beleaguered Strong Man*

Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Summary.

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## GREECE-TURKEY 1

Greek-Turkish tensions reached a new high this week as the Turkish research ship, the Sismik I, sailed into disputed Aegean waters. Both Greece and Turkey implemented contingency military measures, and Greece appealed to the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice.

The ship conducted research in an uncontested area in the northern Aegean for several days, and then Ankara announced late last week it would begin the second phase of its operations in waters claimed by Greece between the islands of Limnos and Lesbos. The Sismik apparently entered the disputed area several times

last weekend. Athens issued sharp protests, which the Turks rejected.

Greece increased the readiness of its armed forces but seemed reluctant to risk a military confrontation by interfering directly with the Turkish ship. The Greeks, instead, took their case to the UN and unilaterally petitioned the Court to enjoin the Turks from activity in contested waters. The Court's procedures are cumbersome, however, and it will be a number of weeks before it rules. The Security Council may find it difficult to do little more than to urge both sides to exercise restraint.

The Caramanlis government appears to enjoy public support for its moves thus far, but it will be hard pressed to produce alternative measures if appeals to the UN and The Hague are unsuccessful.

The Demirel government in Turkey has thus far adopted a firm approach, but it is under pressure from the opposition to act even more forcefully. The Turks have

already declared that they intend to continue their activity and have warned the Greeks against harassing the research ship. They have also noted that decisions of the Security Council and of the Court are not binding.

Despite statements by both sides that they want to avoid a clash, each is engaging in activities that run the risk of an armed confrontation, either through accident or miscalculation.

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## ITALY 2-4

Prime Minister Andreotti's Christian Democratic government survived a parliamentary vote of confidence this week through the abstention of most of the other major parties, including the Communists. Both the Christian Democrats and the Communists will now try to strengthen their positions in anticipation of another shuffle—which could come before the end of the year.

Some observers believe the Christian Democrats will attempt to rebuild their alliances with their traditional coalition partners, which were shattered by the results of the parliamentary elections in June. The Christian Democrats need to revive ties with the Socialist Party, in particular, if they are to avoid continued



Giulio Andreotti

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dependence on Communist abstention—an arrangement that gives the Communists a virtual veto over government programs.

In the meantime, the Christian Democrats will be obliged to consult closely with the Communists, who have also been awarded a number of key parliamentary posts. While some Christian Democratic leaders may be resigned to increased collaboration with the Communists, others will probably find such cooperation intolerable and may work behind the scenes to bring the government down. The Communists will drive a hard bargain but will strive at the same time to minimize frictions and to lay the groundwork for broader collaboration with the Christian Democrats.

The Communists have indicated that their abstention entitles the party to credit for providing the country with a government to deal with its pressing economic and social problems. They assert, however, that the government did not merit a Communist vote of confidence, and that abstention represents only a "first step" toward party leader Berlinguer's goal of full Communist membership in a government with the Christian Democrats. The Communists clearly intend to seek additional concessions, and their tough stand is probably designed to reassure party members that the party has not sold out to the Christian Democrats.

The Communists continued to consolidate their election gains by forming a left coalition with the Socialists and Social Democrats in the municipality of Rome. In Rome's municipal election in June, the Communists outpolled the Christian Democrats by 35.5 to 33.1 percent. Communists now are coalition partners in the governments of 8 of Italy's 10 largest cities.

overshadowed by the arrival in Lisbon the day before of former president Spínola.

Spínola was taken into custody immediately, but was released shortly after the assembly vote. Military authorities cited "insufficient evidence" of involvement in the March 1975 coup to detain him further, but they said investigations of his political activities during his year and a half in exile were continuing.

Spínola's return has sparked left-wing warnings that the centrist policies of the new minority government portend a "return to fascism." President Eanes and Prime Minister Soares had recently



Mario Soares AP

declared that Spínola was welcome to return provided he answered charges against him. Government leaders had urged Spínola to delay until their program was through the assembly, but his return did not affect the passage of the program. Lacking an alternative program, none of the opposition parties was prepared to urge rejection.

The Communists and the single far left-wing delegate in the assembly sharply attacked Socialist proposals for a "capitalist recovery" for the economy, but Communist leader Cunhal said that

his party will not "systematically" oppose Socialist legislation. The centrist Popular Democrats and the conservative Social Democratic Center voiced only mild criticism.

The government's problem now is to follow through on its promises. The program proposes to strengthen Portugal's sagging economy by restricting spending and exercising some control over labor but at the same time promises overly ambitious social projects.

USSR

Soviet industry performed poorly in the first half of 1976.

Industrial production rose less than 4 percent over the same period last year, reflecting the effects of the 1975 harvest failure on those sectors using agricultural raw materials. Production of producer durables and some key industrial materials also slackened.

Even if the 1976 harvest turns out well, a rebound in industrially processed food is unlikely before late 1976.

The 7-percent decline in processed food production was a major disappointment to Soviet leaders. Compared with the first half of 1975, the production of meat dropped by nearly one fifth and vegetable oil by nearly one quarter. Production of dairy products declined by 4 percent and of canned goods by 8 percent.

The performance of heavy industry was sluggish. Chemical production increased less than 6 percent, compared with 11 percent in the first half of 1975.

The failure to fulfill plans for mineral fertilizer and sulfuric acid has resulted from delays in the expansion of production capacity, shortages of natural gas, and maintenance problems.

The slackening of growth in production of fertilizer and other agricultural chemicals, coupled with smaller production increases of tractors and agricultural machinery, could hamper growth of the farm sector.

PORTUGAL

The final approval of Portuguese Prime Minister Soares' government program by the national assembly on August 11 was

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22-23; 25

## USSR-AUSTRALIA

The Soviets last week made their most authoritative public affirmation to date of dissatisfaction with the conservative policies of the new Australian government. The comment, which appeared in *Red Star*, was meant almost certainly to buttress private warnings to the Australians to mute their anti-Soviet polemics.

The article was pegged to Prime Minister Fraser's recent trip to Washington. It focused on increased US-Australian military cooperation—particularly in the nuclear field—that has allegedly resulted from the trip. *Red Star* charged that Australia's new policies are making it possible for the Pentagon to recoup US losses in Indochina and Thailand and to link US strategic bases stretching from the Far East to the Persian Gulf. The only Asians who approve "the dangerous, adventurous trends" in Australian foreign policy, the article said, are the Chinese.

Moscow has been disturbed about the policies of the Liberal/Country coalition ever since it came to power last December, but responses in the Soviet media to the repeated anti-Soviet statements of Prime Minister Fraser have been restrained.

There has been no discernible impact yet in Soviet-Australian diplomatic relations. Deputy Prime Minister Anthony, who visited Moscow in July, said his trip went well and that there was no detailed discussion of Australia's anti-Soviet line. Economic relations also seem unaffected; the day before the *Red Star* article appeared, the Soviets bought 12,000 tons of Australian meat.

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## GERMANY 21

The fatal shooting of an Italian truck driver by East German border guards last week has sharpened propaganda between West and East Germany.

The West German press has given extensive coverage to the incident—the first such killing of a non-German Westerner. Several West Germans have been involved in similar incidents in recent weeks. Spokesmen for all the major political parties have condemned the shootings.

Facing a close election in less than two months, the Bonn government is particularly sensitive to opposition charges that it is ineffective in preventing such incidents.

Opposition leaders, including the Christian Democrats' chancellor-candidate Kohl, have insisted that Bonn apply economic sanctions against East Berlin, but the Schmidt government has ruled this out; government spokesmen say that past Christian Democratic-led governments also refused to cut off trade credits.

East Germany's embarrassment at what it sees as West Germany's exploitation of the latest affair was apparent in a major commentary in the August 9 party daily. The article described the Italian victim as a "friend of the German Democratic Republic"—he was a member of the Italian Communist Party—and noted the "mysterious circumstances" of his death.

The paper attacked Bonn for playing election politics and, for the first time, warned of the possibility of curtailing the travel of West German tourists and visitors. Bonn's permanent representative in East Berlin has discussed the border problem with East German Deputy Foreign Minister Nier. Both sides still seem eager to contain the situation.

## USSR-SOMALIA 17-20

During a visit last week of an official delegation from Somalia headed by Vice President Mohamed Ali Samantar, the Soviets almost certainly attempted to allay Somali misgivings about the Soviets' warming relations with Ethiopia.

Ties between the Soviet Communist

Party and the new Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party were emphasized. Samantar talked with Politburo member Kirilenko, evidently standing in for Brezhnev, now on vacation, and party secretary Ponomarev.



Vice President Samantar

Military matters were reportedly also on the agenda, and the Soviet military paper *Red Star* gave front page coverage to the meeting between Samantar, who is also Somalia's defense minister, and Soviet General Staff Chief Kulikov.

The Soviets continued to play both sides of the fence on the French Territory of Afars and Issas issue. Although Moscow dropped references in the Soviet-Somali communique to "sovereignty," "territorial integrity," and "noninterference in internal affairs" made at the time of the Ethiopian visit in July, the Soviets failed to endorse fully Somalia's irredentist position.

A high-level Ethiopian government delegation was recently given red carpet treatment in Moscow, perhaps in part to demonstrate to the Somalis that Soviet friendship cannot be taken for granted. But Moscow has been reluctant to go too far in its courtship of Ethiopia for fear of jeopardizing its Somali stake.

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## Middle East-Africa

### RHODESIA


26-30; 32

Clashes between Rhodesian security forces and guerrillas assisted by Mozambican troops sharply increased this week.

On August 8, five Rhodesian soldiers were killed when guerrillas and Mozambican troops attacked a Rhodesian army camp. It was the largest loss publicly acknowledged by the Rhodesians in a single engagement since the guerrilla war began in late 1972.

Rhodesian forces immediately retaliated with a well-planned strike into Mozambique, reportedly killing more than 300 Rhodesian guerrillas and 30 Mozambican troops. Early on August 11, the Rhodesian border town of Umtali, an important white urban center, was hit by mortars that were probably fired by Mozambican troops.

Rhodesian security forces now face the prospect of guerrilla operations from Zambia into northwestern Rhodesia. Guerrillas, who began probes in this area late last month, are probably members of Joshua Nkomo's rebel faction, which deserted guerrilla camps in Mozambique dominated by a rival nationalist group.



820263 8-78

Zambian President Kaunda declared last week that guerrilla activity along the Zambian border would be stepped up.

As the guerrilla war intensifies, more white settlers are leaving Rhodesia. The government recently announced a net loss of 2,280 whites in the first half of the year compared with a net gain during 1975. The government has imposed strict currency controls in an attempt to stop the white exodus.


Rapidly rising military costs have forced Rhodesia to take strict measures to ease the growing economic burden of the war. According to the Rhodesian finance minister, the government will cut transportation, housing, and local government services and divert those funds to the military.

### SOUTH AFRICA

23-36

Student demonstrations in Soweto, a black suburb of Johannesburg, again have triggered rioting, which has spread to many other black townships. Unlike the largely spontaneous violence in June, however, the rioting last week resulted from organized efforts by militants to impose school boycotts and industrial work stoppages. Furthermore, the new disturbances are more widely dispersed geographically, although police have reasserted basic control in most instances with less bloodshed this time—some 35 known deaths by August 12, compared with 176 within one week in June. (*The riots in June and their implications for South Africa are discussed on page 10.*)

Some 5,000 Soweto students gathered in a soccer stadium on August 4, ostensibly to protest the continuing detention of students arrested in June. The demonstrators, joined by thousands of other youths, stoned commuter trains and buses. Less extensive rioting and intimidation of commuters also occurred in several other black townships around Johannesburg, and roughly half of the black industrial workers in the



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metropolitan area were absent from their jobs on August 4. By August 6, police had regained sufficient control to enable most commuters from the black townships to get to their jobs.

This week, however, new disturbances were reported in many localities. In the Cape Town area, the most serious violence since June occurred on August 11 when adult residents of three black townships joined in student rioting. Police have confirmed 23 deaths there, compared with 12 in the disorders elsewhere since August 4.

Trouble also flared in a black suburb of Durban and in Mafeking, capital of the Bophuthatswana tribal homeland, where students burned down the building in which the tribal legislative assembly met.

The many clashes with police have intensified militant attitudes among black students throughout South Africa. The recent arrests of many known activists in the Black People's Convention—the main organization of South African blacks—and its student affiliates may have spurred the emergence of a fluid "street leadership."

Prime Minister Vorster's only public comment on the latest rioting has stressed that the government will neither tolerate further violence nor make concessions to dissidents. Earlier consultations between government leaders and authorized spokesmen for urban blacks have been suspended. Vorster's apparent strategy is to show firmness until the militant students are squelched, then resume consideration of some limited modification of the apartheid system.

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## LEBANON 37-38

Any hopes that the nationwide cease-fire agreement of August 5 would take hold quickly faded late last week when Christian militia forces resumed their attacks in eastern Beirut just before the truce was to take effect. The Christians overran most of the Muslim enclave of Nabaa and increased their efforts to root out the remaining Palestinian defenders in Tall Zatar, forcing the Red Cross to suspend its attempts to evacuate noncombatants and the wounded.

The Christians seem to be preparing—once Tall Zatar falls—to revive their offensive against Palestinian positions in the nearby, predominantly Christian Mount Lebanon area. Large concentrations of Christian forces on the eastern and southern edges of Beirut and heavy fighting between Alayh and Kahhalah on the Beirut-Damascus road suggest that the Christians may also attempt to sever the Palestinians' supply routes from the south leading into western Beirut.

The improvement in the Christians' military fortunes has strengthened the position of their more intransigent elements, especially Interior Minister Shamun. Shamun and President Frangiyah have probably been principally responsible for the Christians' blatant violations of the cease-fire.

Ready to seek a negotiated settlement only a little over a month ago, the Christians now appear determined to fight on. They are convinced that a military victory is within their grasp and that Israel, if not Syria, will support their objectives. Both countries have been supplying the Christians clandestinely with arms. There is even some talk among the hard liners of Frangiyah remaining in office beyond the end of his term in September unless president-elect Sarkis is willing to support their efforts to reunify Lebanon by military means.

For the moment, the Syrians are content to sit back and let the Christians wear down the Palestinians and Lebanese leftists. Damascus has repeatedly turned

aside efforts by Arab League mediators to convene the quadripartite truce committee called for in the recent Syrian-Palestinian accord. Late this week, the Syrians raised new demands that conservative Muslim leaders sympathetic to Syria be represented on the committee—clearly a deliberate attempt to give the Christians more time to consolidate their gains.

Neither the Palestinians nor Lebanese leftists have renounced the cease-fire accord, but their newspapers have roundly denounced the Syrians' latest demand. In an open letter to President Sadat, Yasir Arafat accused Syria of maneuvering on behalf of the Christians and of expanding its own military offensive against the fedayeen. Arafat sent similar messages to other Arab leaders and met this week with the Soviet ambassador in Beirut, presumably to request that Moscow put

more pressure on Damascus to settle with the Palestinians.

The Israelis have tried to further weaken the Palestinians and safeguard against the resumption of terrorist raids from southern Lebanon. The Israeli press recently acknowledged that the Rabin government has been secretly supplying the Christian militias with arms and other supplies for some time. The Israeli navy also began last week to intercept ships in Israeli waters suspected of carrying arms to the Palestinians.

In addition, Israeli officials have been meeting over the past few months with renegade elements of the Lebanese Arab Army in southern Lebanon and are continuing to promote their so-called "open fence" policy, allowing Lebanese civilians to cross over the border to obtain medical treatment, food, and even work in the northern Galilee.

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Not Sourced

**Soviets More Relaxed About Syria**

Comments this week by a ranking Soviet official suggest that Moscow may be less concerned now than it was a few weeks ago about Syrian intentions regarding the Palestinians. The Soviets may be seeking to avoid further deterioration in bilateral relations in the face of Damascus' actions.

During a talk with the political counselor of the US embassy in Moscow, a deputy chief of the Middle East division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry seemed resigned to the Lebanese situation. The official stuck to the line that there ought to be a cease-fire followed by talks among the Lebanese parties without outside interference, and that Lebanese territory and independence should be respected.

He was pessimistic about the recent agreement between Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization, however, and said the Lebanese civil war is far from over.

Although the Soviet official expressed no special concern about the fate of the

PLO, he did admit that it is impossible to predict the long-range effect of Lebanon on the Palestinians. He said he believed Yasir Arafat would remain in command of the PLO, but volunteered no information about a long-rumored visit by the PLO leader to the USSR.

According to the official, Soviet-Syrian relations are completely normal, despite disagreement over the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon. He dodged the question of whether the USSR favors a complete and immediate Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon by saying that when and how the troops are to be withdrawn is for the Lebanese and the Syrians to decide.

On an overall Middle East settlement, the Soviet official expressed doubt that any progress would be possible until at least this winter, after the US election. He did, however, state that the next proposal for Middle East negotiations would have to come from the US.

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*Kenyans recently fleeing Uganda*

43, 44, 46, 47; ~~48~~

## KENYA-UGANDA

President Kenyatta of Kenya and Amin of Uganda last weekend signed a memorandum of understanding designed to normalize relations between their two countries. Kenyan and Ugandan negotiators reached agreement after three days of talks in Nairobi.

The terms of the agreement largely satisfied Kenyan conditions for improving relations, although no reference was made to Kenya's earlier demand that Amin renounce claims to Kenyan territory. Uganda's capitulation on most issues

reflected the serious impact that Kenyan sanctions were having on its economy. The Ugandan negotiators were clearly under instructions to ensure normalization of trade and the resumption of oil shipments to Uganda.

The two governments agreed to withdraw troops from border areas and to cease hostile public statements. Ugandan troops on the Kenyan border have returned to their barracks, according to a Kenyan official.




## KUWAIT

48-49

Kuwait appears to be the major stumbling block to any formal relaxation of the Arab boycott of Western firms doing business in Israel.

Other major Arab nations have lined up behind Egypt's new proposal, which would permit a company to be removed from the blacklist for investing in Israel if it also made substantial investments in Arab countries. The new formulation would no longer consider franchise arrangements in Israel as cause for inclusion on the list. Egypt's proposal will be raised formally at the Arab League meeting this fall.

Kuwait's inflexible position may reflect its fears of offending the large Palestinian community that makes up nearly 30 percent of Kuwait's population of 1 million.



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## East Asia-Pacific

CHINA

*N. Sourced*

The strong earthquakes that struck North China in late July and early this month have crippled the region's economy and impaired China's economic growth for the year.


The area directly affected by the recent series of quakes extends from Peking north-northeast 90 kilometers (55 miles) to the Mi-yun Reservoir, east 270 kilometers (170 miles) to Shan-hai-kuan, and southeast 160 kilometers (100 miles) to the Ta-kang oil field near Tientsin. Tang-shan, a major industrial complex with more than 1 million inhabitants, was near the epicenter and reportedly was leveled.

Most industries within 100 kilometers (62 miles) of Tang-shan were affected. Nearly all sectors of industry are represented in this area, which accounts for over 10 percent of China's industrial output.

The quake area encompasses some 250 industrial installations, including chemical and fertilizer plants, iron and steel plants, electric power plants, major cement plants, and mining complexes. Three major oil refineries are located in the area.

China's largest petrochemical plant, 40 kilometers (25 miles) southwest of Peking, may also have been damaged. Damage to the oil field at Ta-kang apparently was slight. According to official reports, output was restored to pre-quake levels within two days. Ta-kang, China's third largest oil field, produces some 5 percent of total crude oil output and a considerable quantity of natural gas.

We still have little specific information



on the extent of damage to industrial facilities, although known and likely damage to transport and communications alone will slow recovery. Tang-shan is located astride key communication, rail, and road links, and the quake doubtless has disrupted industry outside the immediately stricken area.

The shocks probably also cut the major oil pipeline connecting the large Ta-ching oil fields to Peking.

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51-55

## THAILAND-VIETNAM

Thai Foreign Minister Phichai announced after his visit to Hanoi last week that diplomatic relations had been established between the two countries.

The communique on diplomatic recognition essentially follows the four-point formulation Vietnam used with the Philippines:

- Noninterference in each other's internal affairs and peaceful coexistence.
- No bases to be used by foreign powers against the other party.
- Resolution of disputes through negotiations.
- Promotion of regional cooperation in the "interests of independence and neutrality."

In a separate communique, both sides also agreed in principle to overflight rights for commercial aircraft and to future discussions on economic cooperation.

Thailand was the last of Vietnam's Southeast Asian neighbors to normalize relations. Two issues that were significant roadblocks in the past—the return of Vietnamese refugees living in Thailand since the end of the French Indochina war and the return of South Vietnamese aircraft flown to Thailand at the end of the war last year—were also set aside for future discussions. The Vietnamese pressed hard for the return of the aircraft.

Neither issue is likely to be resolved soon. Hanoi has consistently resisted repatriation of Vietnamese in Thailand, and the aircraft in dispute have been returned to the US, cannibalized for parts, or integrated into the Thai inventory.

Hanoi's willingness to set aside difficult issues suggests that the Vietnamese are intent at this time on promoting an image of reasonableness, which will serve them well at next week's nonaligned summit and in the UN this fall.

Last week Phichai also held talks with the Lao communist leaders. The Thai

have agreed to reopen the border at two or three more points in exchange for the release of Thai prisoners still held by the Lao.

## JAPAN 56-57

With the balance of power in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party now clearly in his favor, deputy prime minister Fukuda hopes to persuade Prime Minister Miki to resign.

On Wednesday, Fukuda held the first in a series of talks with Miki about the party's future following the Lockheed scandal. Finance Minister Ohira, a former rival of Fukuda, but who for the first time last weekend publicly endorsed Fukuda's bid for leadership, may attend future meetings.

Fukuda apparently hopes that a series of meetings will offer Miki a face-saving means of retreat as the Lockheed investigation draws to a close and support for new leadership in the LDP grows. Miki would come under severe pressure to follow tradition and resign if a party official or cabinet member is implicated as the investigation unfolds.

Fukuda and Ohira are also planning to convene a special party convention late this month in order to win official endorsement of a leadership change. Faced with the prospect of a humiliating defeat at such a caucus, Miki could agree to step aside voluntarily.

There have been no major developments in the investigation since the arrest of former prime minister Tanaka on July 27. Prosecutors are under pressure to complete the probe by the end of the month, and arrests of other




Prime Minister Miki (l) and Finance Minister Ohira

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*The Mangyongbong, which the North Koreans will use for security and logistic support at the nonaligned conference*

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politicians could occur at any time. Because Diet members are immune to interrogation and arrest while in session, there is widespread agreement that the investigation must be concluded before the Diet is convened. The Diet must begin action on necessary fiscal legislation next month so that campaigning for national elections can get under way in the fall.

## NORTH KOREA 58-60

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North Korea raised the level of its anti-US invective in a sharply worded government statement on August 5.

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Since early this spring North Korean propaganda has charged almost daily that the US is introducing new weapons into the South, conducting provocative military exercises, and keeping South Korean armed forces on a war footing. The government statement asserts that the US and South Korea have now "completed" war preparations and are ready to "kindle the fire of war."

The statement does not appear to signal a shift by the communists to more aggressive tactics, but it does seem calculated for maximum impact at the non-

aligned summit that opens Monday in Colombo. Pyongyang wants the nonaligned conference to issue a political resolution that brands the US as the major source of tension on the Korean Peninsula and supports the communist demand for a unilateral withdrawal of US forces and the scrapping of the armistice agreement. The statement dismisses as "stalling tactics" the recently renewed US proposal for a four-power conference on Korea to seek ways to reduce tension.

North Korea is counting on increased support from the nonaligned states to score a decisive victory at the UN General Assembly in the fall. Sri Lanka has been told to expect over 100 persons in the North Korean delegation, and President Kim Il-song is likely to attend the non-aligned conference.

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*The riots in South Africa in June contained characteristics that were different from earlier eruptions of discontent: the demonstrators were the children of the black elite; the bloodletting was unprecedented; demonstrators attacked whites affiliated with the government; and the riots apparently were not organized or directed by outsiders.*

NS

## South Africa: The June Rioting

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The major riots in South Africa in June followed a series of smaller boycotts, protests, and wildcat strikes that have been occurring with increasing frequency during the past five years. A level of black protest that would have been inconceivable to black and white South Africans before 1960 has become commonplace today.

Continued racial violence seems inevitable, particularly in urban areas. There is no sign that the conditions underlying the riots will change any time soon.

- Blacks, crowded into separate crime-ridden urban townships, live in a state of almost constant tension and frustration.

- Black unemployment is high and growing. Most jobs available to blacks are low paid, temporary, and offer little prospect for advancement. Skilled black workers are paid less than a fifth of what whites earn in comparable work.

- The housing shortage in townships is acute. In Soweto alone, 86,000 people are on the housing waiting list. Rents are high and overcrowding endemic.

- Blacks see few opportunities to improve their status. Education is neither free nor compulsory for them. Only about a fifth of school-age blacks attend school; less than 2 percent reach high school.

- A further frustration is the feeling of helplessness. To the average urban black, white authority is all-powerful and capricious; he can be fired, evicted, arrested, or sent to a tribal area and have little recourse.

- There are no good channels for effective contact between the government and the black communities. The authorities have discouraged the development of respected and independent black leaders. The resulting lack of communication has contributed to official insensitivity toward black problems and needs, dimmed awareness of impending trouble, and virtually precluded any chance for useful negotiation.

### June Was Different

The riots in June had much in common with previous eruptions of discontent, but there were differences that may prove significant.

For one thing, the protests in Soweto began with a different kind of demonstrator. Previous outbursts, even though some of them had middle-class leaders, were basically protests by the masses of unskilled and semiskilled, mostly over working-class issues—bus fares, wages, pass-laws and such.

The June demonstrators were the children of the Soweto black elite—the upward-striving merchants and professionals who live in the township's more prosperous sections. These are the fortunate few black children who reach high school.

The recent disturbances also were marked by unprecedented blood-letting. The death-toll—more than twice that of the largest previous outbreak, in Sharpeville in 1960—and the large number of injured suggest the involvement of many more people over a longer period than in previous outbreaks.

In earlier riots, demonstrators typically

turned against the nearest black representatives of governmental authority—bus conductors or police officers, for instance. In the June Soweto riots, two white social workers, both local government employees, were murdered by a mob. And in at least one rural area, white farms were attacked and the owners forced to flee.

In the past, major demonstrations either were initiated by a central organization (the Sharpeville protest by the Pan-African Congress), or were taken over and led by “outsiders.” Zulu officials took over the initially spontaneous Durban strikes, for example.


In the disturbances in June there is so far no evidence that either the organized student demonstrations or the subsequent riots were planned or directed by outsiders, despite official assertions that they were. The rioting appeared to have no direction of any kind.

### Consequences Abroad

The riots have weakened Prime Minister Vorster's main foreign policy initiative: his attempt to persuade other states to take the heat off South Africa while it works its way toward what it asserts will be a more equitable solution to its race problem—separate development.

Relations with other states, particularly the moderate regimes in black Africa, were badly damaged by South Africa's involvement in the Angolan civil war. In the aftermath of the riots, these states will find it even more difficult politically to have any visible dealings with the Vorster government.

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Barricade across the main street of Alexandra, near Johannesburg

The more radical black states will probably press harder for African support of Namibian and South African guerrilla groups.

Vorster's increased isolation is not likely to make him turn inward. The twin threat of further racial violence at home and of increasing outside support of anti-white revolutionaries will probably lead him to undertake an intensive search for any kind of support, but particularly military ties, with the industrial democracies. His chances of success are slim.

#### Consequences in South Africa

The violence has further widened the gulf between South Africa's blacks and whites, and between hawk and dove, rich and poor, and young and old in each community. Conciliation and compromise, never strong features in South African social relations, will be even more difficult to bring about in the aftermath.

The immediate question is whether the government will embark on concessions or repression. If it follows past patterns, it will try some of both, but any concessions are likely to fall short of black expectations.

The riots have already brought official assurances that Afrikaans language re-

quirements—the immediate cause of protests—will be relaxed. They have also led to some 1,400 arrests prior to this month's outbreak and a strong reiteration of the government's determination to maintain law and order above all. In the coming months, any show of black dissidence is likely to be repressed quickly and forcefully.

Perhaps there will be some token concessions designed to persuade conservative blacks that their interests lie in working within the system.

The recent crisis also served further to polarize attitudes within South Africa. The more conservative blacks in Soweto are critical of the rioters for destroying schools, clinics, and other buildings that were badly needed and long in coming. Those who rioted for political reasons probably take satisfaction in having successfully defied white authority.

There were signs of generational differences even before June. In May, for example, Zulu university students stoned the car of their paramount chief, Gatsha Buthelezi. He is one of South Africa's most brilliant and dynamic black leaders. He has repeatedly defied white authorities and publicized the evils of apartheid but

is an advocate of nonviolence and of working within the system to bring about basic change.

Within the white community, too, the recent riots seem likely to cause further polarization. A deep gulf already exists between hard liners and soft liners—a gulf that transcends language barriers and has long affected both the English-speaking and the Afrikaner groups.

#### The Outlook

It seems likely that the latest major violence will sharpen long-standing differences and accelerate existing trends. It is doubtful, however, that this outbreak will affect the long-run course of South Africa's internal political development, or lead to a massive and uncontrollable black uprising in the near future.

The ultimate black-white confrontation is most likely to come, not as a single great cataclysm, but rather as an escalation of the process already under way—outbreaks of black protest of increasing size and frequency, industrial dislocation and rising costs of repression, and eventual economic decline to the point that the system is overwhelmed by its inability to cope with the conflicting demands upon it.

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*One of China's most ambitious foreign aid projects, the Tan-Zam railroad, has been completed. It took about five years and the efforts of 51,000 Africans and Chinese to construct, and it runs through 2,000 kilometers (1,250 miles) of bushland. Tanzania hopes the railroad will play a role in development of agriculture; Zambia hopes the railroad will boost its copper exports.*

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## Tan-Zam Railroad Completed

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China formally turned over operation and management of the Tan-Zam railroad to the Tanzanian and Zambian governments last month.

Vice Premier Sun-Chien, the highest ranking Chinese official to visit Africa in 12 years, and the heads of state of Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, and Botswana gathered at the Zambian terminus, Kapiri Mposhi, on July 14 to celebrate completion of the six-year, \$400-million project, China's largest overseas aid venture.

About 15,000 Chinese and 36,000 Africans cut through 2,000 kilometers (1,250 miles) of bushland to link the Zambian copperbelt with the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam. Construction began in mid-1970, and track laying was completed in June 1975, 15 months ahead of schedule. The first full run was made last September, and the railroad has been in limited use since then.

Landlocked Zambia's desire to break its dependence on Rhodesia's transportation network for access to Mozambican and South African ports triggered the planning 10 years ago. Tanzania saw the project as a stimulus to its economic and social development.

In 1967, China provided a \$402-million, interest-free loan to construct the rail line after the World Bank, the UK, the US, France, and the USSR rejected the project as uneconomical. Repayment

of principal will not begin until 1983 and will be extended over a 30-year period.

When fully in operation later this year, the line will be able to handle 1 million tons of freight annually each way, including 300,000 tons of Zambian copper.

The port of Dar es Salaam, however, will be hard pressed to handle any more copper than it does now. Dar es Salaam has been handling 85 percent of Zambia's exports since the closure of the Benguela railroad through Angola a year ago.

Labor and handling problems, which created backlogs of up to 60,000 tons of copper earlier this year, probably will force Zambia to continue sending exports over the more expensive road-and-rail link through Malawi to Mozambican ports and perhaps to resume the use of the Benguela railroad when it reopens.

Until the Angolan route is usable, Zambian copper shipments are likely to remain 15 to 20 percent below normal export levels.

Tanzania hopes the Tan-Zam railroad will play a key role in the development of previously neglected agricultural areas. The Kilombero Valley and the plateau and hill country surrounding Mbeya in southwestern Tanzania are suitable for sugar, rice, vegetable, and livestock production.

Plans are under way to resettle several million people in farming cooperatives along the rail route.

Northern Zambia, long neglected because of its location off the Livingston-Lusaka-copperbelt axis, has an excellent potential for cattle raising, dairy farming, and production of coffee, tea, corn, and rice.

New industries may also be stimulated. A cement plant and a pulp and paper complex are being considered in southern Tanzania, and the line will open up large untapped reserves of coal and iron ore in the same area.

A 1974 Chinese credit for \$75 million is being used to explore and develop these deposits and to build a 200-kilometer (124 mile) spur line to the area. In addition, a feasibility study has been completed for a 500,000-ton integrated iron and steel plant with an expandable capacity of 1 million tons.


The railroad should also boost tourism. It passes through Ruaha Park, Tanzania's largest elephant sanctuary, and several other game preserves previously accessible only by light aircraft.

For Peking, the venture was designed to counter Soviet influence in Africa and to provide a visible example of Chinese support for the third world when the West and the USSR failed to respond. Chinese assistance on the rail line will continue over the next two years; about 1,000 service technicians are scheduled to remain in operating, maintenance, and training assignments.

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## The Tan-Zam Railroad



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*President Jaafar Numayri's grip on power in Sudan is shaky. There have been five major efforts to oust him—the most recent, a Libyan-supported coup last month—and he will probably face new challenges in the months ahead. Numayri's standing with the country's political power centers and with Sudan's important allies is not solid.*

## Sudan: Beleaguered Strong Man

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Sudan's President Jaafar Numayri, the target of a Libyan-supported coup attempt by conservative Ansar tribesmen last month, will probably face more challenges to his leadership because of his inability to gain broad support for his regime. The latest coup attempt was the fifth major effort to oust him since he seized power in 1969.

Superficially, Numayri's position appears stable. Parliament has granted him special internal security powers, as it did last year following an abortive coup, and most opposition groups appear disorganized. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have publicly supported Numayri; Egypt and Sudan have agreed to a mutual defense pact.

### Regime's Weaknesses

Numayri's continued tenure depends on his relationship with the other Sudanese political forces: the armed forces, tribal and religious groups, students, the Sudanese Socialist Union, and southern Sudanese. His standing with most of these groups is quite shaky. Numayri attempted to remedy this situation on Monday with a government reshuffle. Relinquishing the posts of prime minister and defense minister which he has held since 1972, Numayri appointed a party official and the army's chief of staff to these respective positions. He has also indicated that a further government shakeup will occur next January.

The military has been Numayri's base of power since he seized control in 1969, but currently he seems uncertain of its loyalty. Military units were not involved

in the coup attempt last month, but some former officers joined the rebels.

Numayri's distrust of the army is so great that, according to [ ] the US embassy, when the government learned of the coup plotting, security officials automatically assumed the army was involved and ordered confiscation of their weapons. As a result, army units were unable to respond quickly to rebel attacks during the coup.

The military reportedly has been critical of Numayri for questioning its loyalty at that time, and he has visited a number of units in an effort to soothe ruffled feelings. Recently he ordered a pay increase of roughly 40 percent for all military ranks and the police. Numayri also hopes to improve his relations with the military by acquiring Western equipment to replace aging Soviet-supplied arms.

The army's irritation over Numayri's suspicion of its loyalty, however, fosters the plotting that increases Numayri's doubts about army loyalty. He could be ousted if he fails to repair his personal relations with influential officers.

Numayri's standing with the military is critically affected by his relationship with western Sudanese tribesmen who provide two thirds of the army's manpower. These tribesmen are not being directly accused of involvement in last month's move—as they were in an abortive coup last September—but the government has characterized their region as a hotbed of dissident activity. Troops were sent to western Darfur Province last month, apparently to forestall trouble there.

Sudan's diverse conservative Islamic groups remain a source of active dissidence. The three-million member Ansar sect, which spearheaded the coup attempts last month and in September 1975, has been at odds with Numayri since he came to power. The execution last week of nearly 240 people who had participated in the coup will only heighten this enmity.

Numayri has attempted to woo the Khatmiyya sect, a traditional rival of the Ansar, but the political arm of the Khatmiyya, the National Unionist Party, evidently participated in the two most recent coup attempts.

The third major conservative religious force in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood, has been and is likely to remain opposed to Numayri. The Brotherhood appears to have collaborated with the Ansar in the September 1975 coup attempt, and individual members may have been involved in the move last month.

The Brotherhood, unlike the other two groups, is strongest among students. Khartoum University has long been a source of antigovernment activity. Since the September 1975 coup attempt, Numayri has used repressive measures against both students and faculty.

Student adherents of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Sudanese Communist Party apparently cooperate in opposing the regime, despite their ideological differences. Although not numerically strong, the students have become an important political force because they can organize antigovern-

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ment demonstrations that gain significant popular support.

#### Some Assets

Numayri created the Sudanese Socialist Union in 1972, modeling it on Nasir's political party in Egypt. The leftist-dominated organization is Sudan's sole mass political party and claims a membership of 2.5 million. The party has



Jaafar Numayri

not, however, succeeded in mobilizing popular support for the regime.

Numayri's position is strongest among southern Sudanese, most of whom are blacks with different cultural traditions than the Arabs who dominate other parts of the country. Feted as a hero in 1972 for ending a 17-year-long civil war that had ravaged the south, Numayri is the south's best hope that the national government will not attempt to impose Arabic and Islamic culture on the southern people. During the July coup, southern leaders in Juba, the regional capital, announced their loyalty to Numayri's regime before the outcome of the fighting in Khartoum was known. 25X6

The support of southern-manned military units, while important to Numayri, will not protect him against coup attempts that take place in the capital or in other Arab-inhabited areas of northern and central Sudan.

#### Inter-Arab Relations

On the surface, the Egyptian-Sudanese mutual security pact concluded last month would seem to strengthen Numayri's position. Numayri reportedly had been dickering for the pact for 18 months, and he probably views it as an Egyptian commitment to come to his aid whenever necessary. Egypt, however, probably sees the pact as directed against Libya.

In view of the recurring coups, Egypt probably views Numayri's regime as unstable. Egypt could well sit on the sidelines if Sudanese dissidents who were neither leftists nor assisted by Libya moved against Numayri.

If Egypt tried to aid Numayri, it would hurt him in the long term. Sudan was administered as an Egyptian colony for over a century before it became independent in 1956.

Sudanese ill feelings toward Egypt were reinforced in the 1950s and 1960s by president Nasir's attempts to control Sudan's policies. Too close an embrace of Egypt by Numayri would discredit him and his regime in the eyes of the Sudanese people. Southern Sudanese are particularly negative about Egypt.

The Saudis believe Numayri's regime will fall unless he can broaden his base of support. The Saudi royal family has supported Numayri's nominally socialist government as a lesser evil than a more leftist regime.

After Numayri's denunciation of President Qadhafi's role in the July coup attempt, relations between Sudan and Libya are likely to stay cool. Diplomatic ties have been broken. Numayri's increasingly close identification with Sadat will stimulate Qadhafi to increase his support for dissident Sudanese residing in Libya.

Sudanese officials say many of the approximately 6,000 Ansar who fled to Ethiopia after the army crushed an uprising by the sect in 1970 are now living in Libya. Qadhafi can use them to mount further coup attempts against Numayri, and there is little Numayri can do about it.

#### An Unstable Country

Africa's largest country geographically, Sudan is riven by ethnic, social, political, and religious differences. Numayri's success in clinging to power for the past seven years is based more on the inability of his opposition to cooperate against him than to his capacity to create a stable political climate in the country. Only when the unpopular Sudanese Communist Party attempted a coup in July 1971 was there any strong public reaction against those attempting to oust him.

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